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The examples in (1) illustrate a phenomenon that has attracted considerable 
theoretical attention ever since the era in which a transformation known as 
EQUI(valent NP Deletion) was supposed to have deleted the underlying subject of 
the embedded phrase (Rosenbaum 1967, 1970). 
(1) a. Sami hopes [�i to be invited to the party]
b. My wife thinks Ii want [0i to feed the ldds] 
c. The candidatei promised the voters [0i to reduce the deficit] 
d. Sam forced Jackj [0i to eat the pizza]
Two imponant features of this phenomenon (in English), hencefonh COMPLEMENT 
CONTROL, are (i) that a nonfinite predicative phrase functioning as a complement of a
lexical head does not have a subject overtly expressed internally. and (ti) that a spe. 
cific argument of the lexical head of which the predicative phrase is a complement is 
necessarily interpreted as the latter'S subject Thus. where .�' in these examples 
represents the phonologically unexpressed subject argument of the bracketed 
phrase,l the only interpretation available is one in which this argument is coreferen­
tial with the NP marked in these examples with the same index. which is said to be
the CONTROlLER. 
This paper is concerned with the nature of the principles that ensure the cor­
rect choice of controller. Based on the observation that in cases where there is a 
potential choice the nonsubject is generally chosen (as in (ld». one proposal has 
been a MINIMAL DISTANCE PRINCIPLE (Rosenbaum 1970, Chomsky 1980. Larson 
1991), according to which the syntactically closest NP is chosen.2 Due in part to 
the fact that obvious manipulations of syntactic position do not affect controller 
choice, as illustrated for example by comparing ( l d) with (2a) or (2b) with (2c),
various thematic. semantic, and/or pragmatic alternatives to a syntactically based 
condition have been explored (for example. lackendoff 1972, 1987. 1990. Comrie 
1984, Foley & Van Valin 1984, Farkas 1988, Sag & Pollard 1991).
1 In most GB analyses controlled complements are clauses wilh an empty NP subject - either 
the [+anaphoric) PRO (for example. Chomsky 1981. Manzini 1983) or some other variety of null 
pronoun (Huang 1989. Borer 1989). An alternative approach is to analyze controlled complements 
(at the phrase sttucture level) as internally subjectless phrases whose subject is interpreted as one 
of the arguments of their governing predicate (for example, Bresnan 1982. Gazdar et al. 1985, 
Culicover & Wilkins 1986). I simply sidestep this issue here. 
2 Larson (1991) presents an analysis of cases such as (lc) that is consistent with a Minimal 
Distance Principle, by virtue of the fact that at an abstract syntactic level. the subject of promise is 
the 'closest' NP, in the hypothesized relevant sense of closeness. 
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(2) a. Jacki was forced by Sam [flSi to eat the pizza] 
b. The candidatei made the people a promise [flSi to reduce the deficit] 
c. The people got from the candidatei a promise [flSi to reduce the deficit] 
More or less independently of the question of whether non-syntactic factors 
influence controller choice. an enduring idea has been that some kind of a syntactic 
COMMAND constraint limits the range of potential controllers in some important way. 
In Larson's approach, for example, minimal distance is defined in terms of the na­
tion 'c-command' (Reinhart 1976). Others have pmsued the idea that the unex­
pressed subject of the controlled complement is an anaphor in the sense of the 
binding theory, and as such must (at least under certain conditions) be locally
bound, and hence locally commanded. by its controller. This approach is adopted 
both in certain Government-Binding theory (GB) analyses, in which binding is de­
fIned in terms of c-command (for example. Manzini 1983. Koster 1984, Borer 
1989) and in the Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) analysis of Sag 
and Pollard 1991 (hencefonh S&P), in which binding is defined in terms of the na­
tion 'o-command'. 
The main goals of this paper are to argue that a syntactic command constraint
on complement control is neither necessary nor desirable and to show that apparent
evidence for such a constraint is bener handled otherwise. After presenting in §2 a
lexical semantic analysis of controller choice that ties together in a somewhat novel 
way certain ideas from various sources. in §3 I consider obstacles to a c-command
condition on complement control that the proposed analysis overcomes and in §4 I 
show that, although less problematic than its c-command based analogs. the HPSG
binding-theoretic analysis proposed by S&P fails to account satisfactorily for the 
main problems for which it was intended, i.e., the impossibility of passivized sub­
ject controller verbs eVisser's generalization ') and the fact that the thematically ex­
pected controller is sometimes not chosen with predicates such as promise (the 
'controller shift' problem). I present alternative. more adequate solutions to both of 
these problems, in which syntactic command plays no role. 
2 .  A lexical semantic approach to controller choice 
The approach to the question of controller choice I take is based on three main
ideas. First. following the general son of analysis advocated in Williams 1987, 
1989, the formal mechanism of control involves binding of arguments at the level 
of ARGUMENT STRUCTURE (AS). i.e., the level at which grammatically relevant dis­
tinctions between the semantic arguments of a predicate are represented in struc­
tured 'theta-grids' (as in Hale 1983. Zubizarreta 1987, Rappapon & Levin 1988.
Grimshaw 1990, and many others). Second. following S&P (who build principally 
on insights of lackendoff 1972 and Foley and Van Valin 1 984). control predicates 
can be divided into lexical semantic classes based on which rules for controller 
choice can be stated in terms of thematic relations. Third. under the assumption that 
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thematic relations ('agent', 'patient' ,  'theme', etc.) are convenient labels for cenain 
kinds of relational configurations at the level of (lexical) CONC£PrUAL STRUCTURE 
(CS) (Hale 1983, lackendoff 1987, 1990, Rappaport and Levin 1988, Pinker 
1989). the control rules might look directly to fearures of the CS of the controlling 
predicates. 
As noted by S&P, predicates with controlled complements can be divided into 
three broad classes, according to whether they denote an event involving influence 
to bring about a state of affairs, an event involving commitment to a state of affairs, 
or a state involving a psychological or emotional orientation toward a state of 
affairs. Some representative examples are shown in (3).
(3) Influence 
order, persuade, permit, 
command, direct, 
advise, convince, impel, 
induce, pressure, 
prompt, encomage, 
urge, ask, appeal (to),
cause, force, etc. 
Commitment 
promise, swear, agree, 
contract, pledge. vow. 
try, intend, refuse, 
choose, decline. 
decide, demand. 
attempt, threaten, 
propose, offer, etc. 
Orientation 
want, desire. wish, 
long. prefer, hope. 
need. expect, aspire, 
hate, be eager, be 
able, be easy (for), 
occur (to), be 
important (to), etc.
Under the assumption that the main control principle has the effect of ensuring that 
the subject of the controlled complement be coindexed with another argument of the 
predicate of which it is itself an argument, nothing further needs to be said about 
predicates of orientation. since other than their complement clause, they have only 
an experiencer argument. 3 Only with predicates of influence and certain predicates 
of commitment does a potential choice of controllers arise. 
A schematic lexical entry for predicates of influence such as force and 
convince is plausibly as in (4), following in essence lackendoff's ( 1990) analysis 
of the CS offorce.4 
(4) AS: 
CS: 
[x <Yo z>l [CAUSE ([xl . [Event Z])]
AFFECT ([xl . [y]) 
3 Some predica1eS in the orienwion class appear in strIlCtures which might suggest that there is 
a potential choice of controllers (for example, I want my wife to feed the kids and For me. this 
book will be easy to read). I assume that in both cases the non-experiencer NP is not a semantic 
argwnent of the main clause predicate. as in the raising-to-<.lbjecl and tou.gh movement analyses of 
classical transformational grammar. In the want type case, there is no control; in the easy type 
case, there is control - but the experiencer is the only argument of easy (other than the comple­
ment clause) and thus the only potential controller. 
4 Througbout the paper. I use CS representations of the sort found in Jaclcendoff 1990, simpli­
fied in certain ways. Specifically, I do not distinguish the various varieties of CAUSE and 
AFFECT predica1:eS that need to be recognized. Moreover, I simply represent variable arguments,
corresponding for example to elements of type TIiING, with lower case Roman leuers ([xl) and 
suppress indexing as a way of showing correspondences, letting choice of letter do the job. 
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What seems to matter is that the controller, the object NP in an active clause or the 
direct internal argument, is the influenced or acted on participant. Stated directly in
terms of the CS representation. the controller is the second argument of AFFEC'f. 
which in Jackendoff's system is a predicate on the action tier, where the actor/acted 
on concepwal distinction (in various manifestations) is encoded. 
In the case of predicates of expression of commitment that may optionally ap­
pear in a structure with an oven addressee (such as promise and vow), the con­
troller is the acting participant, as shown in (lc) for example. The lexical entry for 
such predicates is plausibly as in (5). 
(5) AS: 
CS: 
[x <(y), Z>][SAY ([x],  [TO ([y])] . [CAUSE ([x] , [Event Z])])]
AFFECT ( [x] , ) 
The key difference between predicates of influence and predicates of commitment is 
that the internal argument of the latter is riot necessarily conceived of as being fun­
damentally affected by the action, a fact that manifests itself in the contrasting be­
havior of the two types of predicate with respect to the pseudocleft do to test of af­
fectedness (Jackendoff 1990), as illustrated by the following examples. 
(6) a. * What I did to those guys was tell them my name 
b. What I did to those guys was kick them 
(I) a. What I did to those guys was force them to finish the job 
b .  * What I did to those guys was promise them to finish the job 
The contrast between (7a) and (7b). like that between (6a) and (6b). is attributable 
to the fact that an addressee is not conceived of as being necessarily influenced by 
the action denoted by the predicate. The absence of a second argument of AFFEC'f 
in the CS in (5) expresses this intuition. 
In essence, a thematic principle of controller choice needs to say that in case 
there is a potential choice of controllers. the influenced panicipant is chosen, if there 
is one, otherwise the acting participant. The overall control theory contemplated 
here is summed up in the following principles. 
(8) a. The EVENT argument of an XO A denoting a relation of INFLUENCE,
COMMITMENT, or ORIENTATION may/must be expressed as a predicative 
phrase (= CONTROLLED COMPLEMENT), whose subject is necessarily coin­
dexed with another argument of A (;; CONTROlLER).5 
b .  If the CS of an XO A with a controlled complement C contains
[AFFECT (a.. �)] , the controller of C is the argument of A that corre­
sponds to �, if � is not null; otherwise it is a.. 
5 For languages like English, it would further have to be specified that the controlled comple­
ment is nonfinite and without oven subject. features of the phenomenon that appear to vary 
cross·linguistically (see Borer 1989). Presumably, the precise range of semantically compatible 
predicates that allow and/or require control varies cross-linguistically as well. 
(9) illustrates the effects of (8) for ( ld). 
(9) S 
/"...... 
NP vp 
S� p • NP : I J L.
: forced Jack to eat 
: the pizza · ...... · � .. 
: ..... III!-.", 
AS: [xi <Yj [Pj <q>]>] 
. [CAUSE ([SAM]X, [Event ·· · [JACK]P · · ·n] es . AFFECT ([SAM]X, [JACK]Y) 
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The direct internal argument offorce. argument y in the AS, is coindexed with the 
phonologically unexpressed subject argument of eat, p in the AS, by virtue of the 
fact that some argument of force must be coindexed with the subject of eat by (8a) 
and this argument must correspond to the second argument on the action tier in the 
es of force by (8b). In the case of control predicates such as promise, the exter­
nalIactor argmnent is chosen as controller, since it corresponds to the only argument 
on the action tier in the CS. With control predicates of orientation, the experiencer 
argument is chosen because it is the only possible choice, whether or not there is an 
action tier in the CS of such predicates. 
3 .  Obstacles to a c .. command constraint 
A central claim of the approach to control theory sketched above is that 
although reference to the notion 'subject' is required for identification of the con­
trolled argument, position in phrase stIUcture is irrelevant to controller choice. As 
noted above, this claim differentiates this approach from that taken in standard GB 
binding-theoretic accounts of control and accounts based on a Minimal Distance 
Principle. Binding-theoretic accounts claim that the unexpressed subject of a con­
trolled complement is an anaphor, which must be bound (i.e., coindexed with a 
c-commanding NP) in a local domain. The notion 'local domain' is defined in such 
a way as to ensure that the binder be found within the minimal clause containing the 
controlled complement. Thus, the locality effect of (8a) (but not the effect of (8b) , 
is attributed to binding theory. The Minimal Distance Principle approach, as re­
cently revived in Larson 1991. attempts to achieve both the effects of (8b) and the 
locality effect of (8a) by requiring that the subject of a controlled complement be 
bound by the closest c-commanding NP. Since the notion 'c-command' (generally 
defined as in ( 10) plays a crucial role in both of these approaches. they constitute 
62 
viable alternatives to the approach advocated here only if there is in fact a general­
ization concerning possible controllers that employs this notion. 
(10) C -command: X c-commands Y iff the minimal maximal projection dominat­
ing X dominates Y. (Manzini 1983)
I maintain that there is no such generalization, for various reasons.
To begin with S&P point out that the controller may, under certain conditions, 
be expressed in a sentence in a discourse that is distinct from that in which the con­
trolled complement occurs, as illustrated by the following examples.
(1 1) a. Jack persuaded SaJIli of something. I don't remember exactly what, 
but I think it was [0; to fix his car] 
b. The candidate made an appeal to the voterst. It was [0; to vote for 
change] 
Since c-command is a relation among elements dominated by some common S 
node, it is unclear how a local c-command condition on control could be made con­
sistent with examples such as these. The lexical semantic analysis, by contrast,
provides a straightforward account. The bracketed infinitival phrases express se­
mantic arguments of the syntactically remote predicates (persuade in (I ta) and 
appeal in (1 1 b» . The control principles hold for these predicative phrases just as 
they do for those expressed in the more typical syntactically governed position. 
A second problem is that the contrOller can be expressed within various kinds
of phrases that limit its c-command domain in such a way as to preclude syntactic 
binding of the controlled complement's subject, as in the following examples. in 
which the c-command domain of the controller is indicated by angled brackets.6 
(12) a. 
b .  
c. 
(13) a. 
b. 
c. 
It would never occur <[pp to f.Np Jack]i]) [0i to do such a thing] 
It would be easy <[pp for 00 my wife]iJ) [0j to feed the kids] 
Jane pleaded «(Pp with INP the teacher]iJ) [0i to give her son an A] 
<00 [The president's]i only hope]) was [0i to reduce the deficit] 
the promise that (liP [the candidate]i made]) [0i to lower taxes] 
an attempt on <00 [the president's)i part]) [0; to convince the Senate 
to pass the bill] 
Although it is possible that certain of these cases might be amenable to some kind of 
analysis that would allow a c-command constraint to be maintained,? it is unclear
6 (12a-b) illustrale a kind of infinitival phrase in extraposed position that appears to differ from 
the kind discussed by S&P (as in It would bother me to have to do that). Unlike in the latter case, 
in the case of (12a-b), control by the experiencer argument is obligatOry, whether or not the com· 
plement is in the extraposed position, as can be seen from the ungrarnmaticality of ·Tom knew 
that to cut hirme/f would never occur to Jane/it would never occur I/) Jane to cut himself. 
7 As has been observed by others (for example, Chomsky 1981, p. 226, Pollard & Sag 1992.
p. 270, Kuno 1987, Ch. 2), the problem illustrated by the examples in (12) arises in connection 
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whether a non-ad-hoc solution is available. In at least the case of (13b-c), there do 
not seem to be even remotely plausible alternatives that are consistent with a 
c-command constraint. One might claim that the controller is a c-commanding null 
pronoun, rather than the apparent controller expressed in the adjunct phrase. 
However, a structure with a null pronoun should be ruled out for the same reason 
as one with an overt pronoun, as in the examples in (14) (presumably as a violation 
of Principle C of the binding theory). 
(14) a. * the promise from him; that UP [the candidate]; made] . . .  
b .  * hisi attempt on £Np [the president's]; pan] . . .  
It should be clear that the kind of control illustrated by (13b--c) is unproblematic un­
der the approach adopted here. The NPs indicated as controllers must by vinue of 
the meanings of the constructions be understood as the promiser in (13b) and the 
attempter in (l3c); the control principles in (8) ensure that the promiser argument of 
promise and the attempter argument of attempt be interpreted as the controllers. in­
dependently of how (or indeed if) they happen to be syntactically expressed. These 
principles provide a similarly straightforward account of the other cases illustrated 
by the examples in (12) and (13), since in every case the controller is the semanti­
cally appropriate argument of the predicate of which the infinitival phrase expresses 
the event argument. 
Finally, as has been noted elsewhere (Williams 1985. Jackendoff 1990. p. 
67), controllers in certain constructions need not be syntactically expressed at all. 
Consider, for example, sentences such as the following, in which the unexpressed 
subject of the complement clause is necessarily understcxxl as being the same as the 
implicit argument of the governing noun or adjective. 
(15) a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Jack talked aoout an attempt 0; [0; to rob the bank] 
Jack realized it wouldn't be easy 0; [0i to fix this car] 
The boss's order 0; [0i to mop the kitchen] was ignored 
All I want is a promise 0; [0; to do things right] 
In these kinds of structures, the subject of the controlled complement is naturally 
given a so-called 'arbitrary' interpretation, i.e., is interpreted as having an unspeci­
fied human referent. If so, the same interpretation is necessarily given to the implicit 
argument that the semantic control principles designate as controller. It is also pos­
sible for the controlled subject to be interpreted as having the index of a remote 
oven NP, in which case the expected controller must be interpreted in the same 
way. In (15a), for example, the robber may be understood as being Jack; if so, 
Jack is necessarily understcxxl as being the attempter as well. 
The idea that c-command is necessary for control can apparently be main­
tained in the light of examples such as these only at the expense of introducing 
with oven anaphor binding as well, as in I spoke to the men about each other. To my knowledge, 
this problem for a c-command based binding theory remains Wlsolved. 
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some kind of otherwise unmotivated enrichment of syntactic representations or 
complication of the definition of c-command. 8 Under the analysis adopted here, on 
the other hand, implicit arguments of the son under consideration are simply argu­
ments that axe present in AS but not in phrase-markers. For example. the structure 
of the relevant portion of (1 5c) would be as follows.9 
(16) 
AS: 
NP 
/'..... 
NP N' 
Tlte r------
boss's N IP 
: I L : order to mop 
: the kitchen . ., ...  • # • 
[� <"ij .�j ��]>l 
Since complement control involves AS binding, the fact that arguments need not be 
projected in phrase-markers under certain circumstances (quite generally in nomi­
nals, for example) does not affect the indexing procedure. 
By way of conclusion. the generalization concerning complement control is 
that the controller must be a specific argument of a lexical head of which the con­
trolled phrase is interpreted as the event argument, as expressed in the complement 
control principles in (8). It is true that in many cases this relationship coincides with 
local c-command between an NP expressing the controller and the controlled com­
plement. However. as there are also various cases in which an analysis involving 
c-command is apparently not available, a condition on complement control fOIDlu­
lated in terms of c-command misses the generalization. 
4 .  The irrelevance of o-command for control 
4.1.  HPSG binding theory and complement control 
As noted above, the control principles in (8) are inspired in large pan by the 
analysis of complement control proposed by Sag and Pollard (1981  =S&P). Certain 
details of expression aside, the main difference between the analysis advocated here 
and the S&P analysis is that the latter includes - in addition to a set of similar se­
mantically-based control principles - the assumption that the unexpressed subject 
of a controlled complement is an anaphor that is subject to the principles of HPSG 
8 Problems with positing a null NP of the PRO type are discussed in Williams 1985 and
lackendoff 1990. Positing an ordinary null pronoun is problematic for reasons discussed below. 
See Williams 1985 and Roeper 1987 for some other proposals to make implicit arguments count 
as c-commanders.
9 This analysis embodies the claim that nouns of this son have ASs. contra Grimshaw 1990. 
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binding theory. Unlike in the GB version of binding theory, these principles are 
formulated in terms of local O-COM.MAND, a structural relation between elements on a 
SUBCAT list, which is essentially a representation of syntactic argument structure 
in which the elements that a predicate is in syntactic construction with are ordered 
according to relative obliqueness. The key idea is that less oblique elements unilat­
erally o-command more oblique ones - where subjects are less oblique than direct 
objects, which are less oblique than PPs, etc. - and precedence on a SUBCAT list 
correJates with less obliqueness and, at least generally in English, with linear prece­
dence. The HPSG view of the portion of binding theory of immediate relevance is 
expressed in (17) and (18) (from S&P). 
(17) O-comrnt.llUi: A locally o-commands B just in case the content of A is a ref­
erential parameter and 
a. A precedes B on a SUB CAT list; or 
b .  A locally o-commands some C that subcategorizes for B. 
(1 8) Principle A: A locally o-commanded anaphor must be locally o--bound. 
To see how this version of binding theory is supposed to work, let us first 
consider some simple cases involving overt anaphors. The SUBCAT list for (19a) 
is as shown in (19b). 
(19) a .  Jack; cut himselfi 
b .  [SUBCAT <NPi, NP:anai>] 
(20) a. * Jack's comment about herselfi helped the senatori to get re-elected 
b .  comment [SUBCAT<NP[POSS]j, PP[about]:anai>] 
The subject of cut locally o-commands the object anaphor, as there is a SUBCA T 
list on which the former, which is referential, precedes the latter. Since this anaphor 
is locally o-commanded, it must be locally o-bound, i.e., coindexed with a locally 
o-commanding element. Being coindexed with the subject, it is locally o-bound; 
binding theory is satisfied. Consider now the ungrammaticality of (20a). The 
anaphoric PP about herself is locally o-commanded by the possessive NP Jack. 
since this NP is referential and it precedes about herself on the SUBCA T list of 
comment, as shown in (20b). About herself. which - being locally o-commanded 
- must be locally o-bound, is coindexed not with Jack but with the senator, an NP 
which does not locally o-command it; by virtue of the fact that there is no SUBCA T 
list on which the two elements both appear. Since herself is not coindexed with a 
locally o-commanding element, Principle A is violated. 
All that is needed to extend HPSG binding theory to complement contIUl is (i) 
the assumption that the unexpressed subject of the controlled complement is an 
anaphor. and (li) a definition of local o-command such that this anaphor is locally 
o-commanded as if it were on the SUBCAT list of the predicate whose argument is 
the controller, which is the effect of (17b). Controlled complement phrases are as­
sumed to be VPs which, like VPs in general, subcategorize for a subject NP. By 
(17b), the subject of a complement VP is locally o-commanded by whatever locally 
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o-commands that VP. Thus, in (21a), for example, the subjeCt anaphor that the VP 
to eat the pizza subcategorizes for is locally o-commanded by Jack and Sam, since 
these NPs precede the VP in question on the SUBCAT list offorce, as shown in
(2 1 b). 
(21)  a. Jack forced Samj [flSi to eat the pizza]
b. [SUBCAT <NP. NPi. VP [SUBCAT <NP:anai>]>] 
The anaphor is coindexed with Sam, and hence locally o--bound; binding theory is
satisfied. As Sam expresses the influenced argument of force, the semantic control 
principles are also satisfied. 
One way in which the HPSG binding-theoretic approach to control improves 
on its OB analogs is that it does not require all anaphors to be locally bound. Just in 
case there is no local o-commander for an anaphor. it need not be locally o-bound.
This exemption makes possible a plausible account of examples such as the follow­
ing. 
(22) a. The candidate made an appeal to the VOtersi. It was [flSi to vote for 
clwlge] 
was [SUBCAT <NP:it, VP [SUBCAT <N'P:anaj>]>]
b. We witnessed an attempt 0i [0; to rob this bank] 
attempt [SUBCAT <DET, VP [SUB CAT <NP:anaz'>]>] 
In the case of (22a), the unexpressed subject of the bracketed VP is not locally
o-commanded by any element, under the assumption that the subject of was is an 
expletive pronoun, i.e., a pronoun whose content is not a referential parameter, and 
thus not a potential o-commander. In the case of (22b), the anaphor subject of the 
embedded VP is also not o-commanded, since the only other element on the 
SUBCAT list of attempt, being a determiner, is not a potential o-commander. As
the implicit anaphors are exempt from any binding requirement, the coindexing
shown is guaranteed solely by the semantic control principles. 
This approach is not without problems, however. To begin with it encounters 
immediate obstacles with examples such .as (13a) and (1Sc), repeated here as (23a) 
and (24a) respectively. 
(23) a. INP [The president's]jonly hope] j was [flSi to reduce the deficit] 
b. was [SUBCAT <NPj, VP [SUBCAT <NP:anai>]>] 
(24) a. The boss's order f!ji [� to mop the kitchen] was ignored 
b. order [SUB CAT <NP[poss]j, VP [SUBCAT <NP:anai>]>] 
The unexpressed subject of the embedded VP in (23a) is locally o-commanded only
by the president's only hope, but is coindexed with another NP. Although the se­
mantic control principles are satisfied, binding theory apparently is not. Similarly, 
in (23b), the controller is the implicit influenced argument of order rather than the 
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expressed actor argument, which is the only apparent o-cotrimander of the embed­
ded anaphor. 
One might justifiably wonder why any attempt should be made to extend the 
principles of binding theory to complement control, given the independent need for 
a set of principles along the lines of those in (8). There are two classic problems for 
conttol theory that ostensibly motivate such an attempt within the overall S&P ap­
proach. I believe, however, that the proposed solutions to these problems ultimately 
fail and that there are more satisfying solutions that do not involve a local 
o-command condition. 
4.2. Visser's generalization 
Under the assumption that passive by phrases do not precede VP comple­
ments on SUBCA T lists, the HPSO binding-theoretic analysis of control provides a 
potential solution to the problem illustrated by the ungrammaticality of (25a). an in­
stantiation of so-called Visser's generalization. 
(25) a. * Sam was promised fIJ;/by Jaclq [fIJi to fIX the car] 
b .  [SUBCAT <NP, VP [SUBCAT <NP:anai>], PP[byli>] 
The VP and its unexpressed subject anaphor are locally o-commanded by only the 
subject of be promised. They are not locally o-commanded by the optional by 
phrase, as it is more oblique. Neither are they locally o-commanded by the implicit 
promiser argument (in the case of a short passive), because it is either not on the 
SUBCAT list or, if analyzed as a null pronoun, is also more oblique. Since the se­
mantic control principles require that the promiser be the controller, the controlled 
anaphor cannot be bound by its unique local o-commander. The ungrammaticality 
of (25a) is due to a Principle A violation. 
Attractive though this sort of explanation may appear to be, there are at least 
two shortcomings with it. To begin with, there is no basis for the assumption that 
passive by phrases are necessarily more oblique than controlled complements. 
Examples such as (26a) show that a by phrase, when sanctioned, would normally 
precede a controlled complement, as would be expected if it were less oblique. 
(26) a. Jacki was persuaded by Sam [fIJi to fix the car] 
b. Jack appealed to SaDli [!1)i to fIx the car] 
c. Jack's promise from Sami [!1)i to fix the car] was fulfilled 
d.  This car was bought by Sam for himself 
e. This letter was apparently sent by the president to himself 
Furthermore, PPs expressing semantic arguments of predicates nonnally can be 
controllers, as illustrated by (26b-c). Thus, PPs, in general, are less oblique than 
VP complements, under the assumption that obliqueness is relevant to control and 
anaphor binding in the way that HPSG binding theory claims. (26d-e) show that 
passive by phrases may precede and locally o-bind overt VP-internal reflexives, 
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which entails that by phrases may be less oblique than other PPs (including, for ex­
ample, complement to phrases). Independently of (2Sa). it would seem that one 
would have to conclude that by phrases are (or at least may be) less oblique than to 
phrases, which are less oblique than VP complements, in view of which the claim 
that by phrases are necessarily more oblique than VP complements is apparently 
false. 
A second problem arises with respect to examples such as those in (27), 
which illusttate that control fails with passivized subject control verbs, even when 
passivization would result in an impersonal construction with an expletive subject 
pronoun. 
(27) a. * It was hoped f6;/by all; [fit; to have a good time] 
b.  * It was attempted ,,;/by Jack; [flti to fix the car] 
c.  * It was not liked ,,;/by anyone; [fit; to be late for class] 
That the ill-formed.ness of these examples is due to whatever constraint is respon­
sible for (25a) is suggested by the fact that such passive sttuctures are possible in 
cases where the logical subject is not a controller. For example, verbs in this class
that also take a finite non-controlled complement allow impersonal passivization, as 
shown by the examples in (28). Funhermore, impersonal passives can be formed 
on an infinitival complement that is not controlled by the logical subject of the gov­
erning verb. as shown by the examples in (29). 
(28) a. 
b.  
(29) a. 
b. 
It was hoped �/by all [that the weather would be nice] 
It was not liked "lby anyone [that taxes were being raised] 
It was expected of us; ["i to be there on time] 
It was suggested to me; [fit; to try a different approach] 
Ideally, the explanation for the ungrammaticality of (25a) should extend to the ex­
amples in (27), which appear to be bad in precisely the same way. However, the 
S&P account of (25a) as a Principle A violation leaves (27) unexplained. Since the 
logical subject of verbs like be hoped, whether overtly expressed in a by phrase or 
not. is not a local o-commander of the VP complement and its anaphor subject, and 
the superficial subject of such verbs is not a local o-commander by virtue of the fact 
that it is an expletive pronoun, the anaphor should be exempt from any binding re­
quirement and should be able to be freely coindexed with the argument specified by 
the semantic control principles. 
The alternative that I propose is that the ill-formedness of both (25a) and (27) 
is attributable to an analysis of passive (following Bresnan & Moshi 1990) ac­
cording to which the external argument is suppressed at the level of AS, in con­
junction with the assumption that suppressed arguments are not visible for comple­
ment control.IO The optional by phrase in a passive clause is a kind of adjunct, 
10 Another case of argument suppression for Bresnan & Moshi is that of so-called object dele­
tion. whereby the direct internal argument of a ttansitive verb is not syntactically expressed (as in I 
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which corresponds to an element in the CS rather than being projected from the AS. 
Independently, then, of whether there is an oven by phrase, the ASs for the corre­
sponding active and passive versions of a representative selection of control verbs 
are as in (30), where in each case z is the controlled complement, x in the active 
version is the argument selected as controller by the principles in (8), and the sym­
hoI '�. indicates a suppressed argument. 
(30) Active 
promise [x <y. z>] 
persuade [y <x, Z>] 
hope [x <z>] 
suggest [y <to-x, Z>] 
� 
* be promised [� <y, z>] 
be persuaded [� <x. z>] 
* be Iwped [� <z>] 
be suggested [� <to-x, z>] 
The effect of passivization on promise is to suppress in the AS the argument corre­
sponding to the conceptual actor. Since tJ;rls argument must be the controller by the 
semantic control principles in (8) but is suppressed, control fails - whence the un­
grammaticality of (25a). The same explanation holds for the ill-formedness of the 
examples in (27). Impersonal passivization of verbs such as Iwpe would involve 
suppressing the only potential controller. By contrast, control is possible with pas­
sivized persuade and suggest (see (26a) and (29b» , for example. because the con­
troller is not suppressed. 
The important point here is that the facts having to do with Visser's general­
ization do not motivate an o-command constraint on complement control, since 
there is a reasonable alternative account of these facts that is both more comprehen­
sive and more clearly technically viable. 
4.3. Controller shift 
Another kind of apparent motivation for an o-command based bind­
ing-theoretic analysis of control is that it makes possible a resolution of a paradox 
that arises in coMection with S&P's proposed solution to the problem posed by ex­
amples such as (3 1), which shows that under certain circumstances the actor argu­
ment of predicates such as promise need not be the controller (indeed there is 
something of a preference for a shift to object control in such cases), in apparent 
violation of the semantic control principles. 
(3 1) Jack thinks that Ij promised the kidsi [�ilj to be allowed to watch TV] 
Briefly, the paradox is that one of the arguments of promise must be the controller 
(it cannot be Jack, for example); but the factor that is taken to allow controller shift 
eat). The assmnption that suppressed arguments are not visible for complement control, which can 
be easily incorporated into principle (Sa), also buys an account of the well-known fact that object 
deletion sysrematically fails with Object controller verbs (Bach 1979). This approach of course re� 
quires analyzing the implicit argument phenomenon discussed above as being distinct from argu­
ment suppression. 
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effectively exempts the subject of the infinitive from the semantic control principles 
that might otherwise guarantee a specific controller. Principle A of the binding 
theory provides a solution in that it requires that the embedded subject be locally 
bound independently of semantic controller choice. 
In a nutshell, the problem with this line of reasoning is that the factor respon­
sible for controller shift is not correctly identified. There is an alternative analysis 
according to which the possibility of object control follows directly from the se­
mantic control principles and given which the paradox for which Principle A is in­
voked dissolves. This alternative analysis is preferable. moreover, in that it is con­
sistent with a wider range of facts. 
Let us consider in somewhat more detail S&p's analysis of examples such as 
(31). The main idea is that what makes controller shift possible is an independently 
occmring phenomenon they call 'causative coercion'. Causative coercion is sup­
posed to make possible, for example, imperatives based on stative and passive 
verbs, whose superficial subject is not sufficiently agentive to otherwise allow im­
perative formation (Be optimistic!, Be happy!, Be noticed!, for example). Given the 
observation that Be optimistic! means something like 'Make yourself optimistic! ' ,
S&P propose that causative coercion is a lexical process by which a stative or pas­
sive verb is essentially transformed into a causative one. This process is conceived 
of as involving addition of an 'interpolated' causative (i-cause) relation in the se­
mantic content of the verbs in question, with no effect on SUBCA T lists and asso­
ciated phrase structures. Thus, embedding a be allowed type VP with an i-cause 
relation under promise would yield an analysis such as is shown in (32), where the 
semantic content is represented as the bracketed material on the right (certain repre­
sentational details are omitted or simplified; SOA = state of affairs argument). 
(32) 
s 
� 
NP:[1] VP I �
I j NP:[2] VP:[8] 
proIDlsed �e .6.
kids to be allowed . . .  
relation promise 
committor [1] j 
commissee [2] 
SOA 
[7] relation i-cause 
influencer [3] i 
influenced [4] j 
SOA[relation allOW] 
[8] Utfluencer [5] 
Utfluenced [6] j 
SOA 
[SUBCAT <NP:[ I], NP:[2] , VP[SUBCAT <NP: ana:[6]>] :[8]>]
S&P's semantic control principles require that. as shown in (32), the comminor 
participant in the promise relation be coindexed with the 'external' argument of the 
i-cause relation (which is the influencer participant) and that the influenced partici­
pant in the i-cause relation be coindexed with the influenced participant in the allow 
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relation (by virtue of the fact that the latter is, on their analysis, the • external' argu­
ment of passivized allow).l1 Importantly, the semantic control principles do not re­
quire that the influenced participant in the i-cause relation be coindexed with either 
of the participants in the promise relation, or for that matter, with anything other 
than the influenced participant in the allow relation, the net effect of which is that 
the unexpressed subject of to be allowed (together with the necessarily covert influ­
enced argument of i-cause) may bear any index, as far as the semantic control prin­
ciples are concerned. However. since the unexpressed subject of to be allowed is an
anaphor that is locally o-commanded by the NPs corresponding to the participants 
in the promise relation, it must be bound by one of these. Thus, Principle A of the 
binding theory, and this principle alone, ensures that one of the NPs on the 
SUBCA T list of promise be coindexed with the unexpressed subject of 10 be 
allowed. 
As I see it, there are two problems with this general approach to the controller 
shift problem. First, to the extent that causative coercion is an independently identi­
fiable phenomenon, it must be said to apply to a wide range of stative and passive 
predicates, including, for example, all those that allow imperative formation. The 
prediction seems to be that controller shift should be possible in cases such as the 
following. 
(33) a. 
b. 
Ii promised the kidsj [fc'iI*j to be optimistic] 
Ii promised the kidsj [fc'i/*j to be happy] 
Since examples such as these are good with a subject controller, and there is some 
kind of agentive or causative restriction on the content of the controlled complement 
(as evidenced by the oddness of 111 promised the kids to be tall/to know the 
answer/to concern their mother), it would seem that causative coercion would have 
to be allowed with them under the S&P approach. If so, it is far from clear what 
would prevent object control. In fa� the controller shift phenomenon with promise 
is apparently quite limited, being possible only with constructions that express 
some kind of subject potentiation, as in the examples in (34). 
(34) I promised the kidsi [fc'i to be able/permittedlallowed to watch TV] 
This limitation is completely mysterious under the causative coercion analysis.
A second, more serious problem with the analysis is that it fails to account for 
controller shift within nominals with an implicit argument, as can be seen by con­
sidering the following example. 
1 1  More specifically, S&p's control principles require that the external argument (= roughly ar­
gument that would be the smface subject if expressed) of the SOA in a relation of type commit­
ment.. influence, or orientation be coindexed with the commiuor. influenced, or experiencer partici­
pant in this relation. 
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(35) a. I believe the kidSi got only one thing: [a promise from Maxj [0i1j to be 
allowed to watch TV]] 
b. promise [SUBCAT <DET, PP[from]j VP [SUBCAT <.NP:anailj >]>]
In this case, as in (31), the unexpressed. subject of the infinitive must be understood 
as being the same as one of the semantic arguments of promise� i.e., either Max or, 
preferably, the implicit recipient argument, which is understood to be the kids by 
virtue of the overall meaning of the sentence. However, as can be seen from the 
SUBCA T list in (35b), the only local o-commander of the embedded anaphor is the 
PP from Max, which is incorrectly predicted to be its only possible binder.12 
A potentially salvaging move would be to posit a null pronoun on the 
SUBCA T list of promise corresponding to the unexpressed controlling argument. 
There is some evidence however that the unexpressed arguments of such nominals 
are not null pronouns. In F81Tell (1992) it is argued that the complements of certain 
nouns in English, notably nouns such as owner, builder, and composer, may be 
realized as null pronouns (as in This Iwuse; is being sold by the owner proi.) The 
two cases contrast in two significant ways, as can be seen from the following 
examples. 13 
(36) a. ? Which housei did the owner proi put up ti for sale? 
b. You know the housei that I asked you if you remembered who the 
owner pro; was? 
(37) a. Which child; would a promise 0i (from Max) to be allowed to watch 
TV be a surprise to ti? 
b. * You know the childi that I asked you if you remembered when you 
overheard the promise 0; (from Max) to be allowed to watch TV? 
(36a) shows that the null complement of owner gives rise to the so-called weak. 
crossover effect, just as overt pronouns do (Koopman & Sportiche 1982). The 
same effect is not found with the implicit argument of promise in (37a). (36b) 
shows that the null complement of owner, like overt pronouns in general. can func­
tion as a resumptive pronoun in a relative clause structure in which the relativized 
position is within an island. The implicit argument of promise. on the other hand 
cannot, as shown by (37b). These differences are readily explained only if the ar­
guments of promise cannot be null pronouns, in which case (35a) remains a prob­
lem for S&P. 
1 2  Alternatively one might claim that from Max is more oblique than the conlIOlled complement 
and therefore is not a possible binder. In this case, however, the unexpressed subject would not be 
locally o-commanded by any potential binders and should thus be exempt from any binding re­
quirement Why it must be coindexed with one of the semantic arguments of promise remains un­
accounted for. 1 3 It is worth noting that all the predicates with implicit arguments discussed in §3 follow the
pattern of promise. suggesting that a null pron01Dl analysis is not available for any of these cases 
(see fooUIOte 8).
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An alternative analysis of controller shift that overcomes the problems facing 
the S&P account builds on Larson's (1991) observation that examples such as the 
following have essentially the same meaning. 
(38) a. 
b. 
I promised the kids to be permitted/allowed to watch TV 
I promised the kids £:Np permission to watch TV] 
The question, then, is what is the meaning of (38b)? It seems relatively clear that 
promise as used in (38b) is a 'double object' or 'dative shift' transfer of possession 
verb in the class of give. (39a) denotes an event involving a realized transfer of 
possession (or causing to have) of a somewhat more abstract son than (39b). 
(39) a. 
b. 
I gave the kids (Nppermission to watch TV] 
I gave the kids lNP a car] 
(38b) differs from (39a) essentially only in that it denotes an event involving an ex­
pression of commitment to the same sort of transfer of possession. 
Let us assume, following in essence Iackendoff 1990 and Pinker 1989. that 
the lexical semantics of double object transfer of possession predicates is as indi­
cated in the following schematic lexical entry. 
(40) AS: 
CS: 
[x <yo Z>] [CAUSE ([x] , [HAVE ([y] , [z])])]
AFFECT ([x] , [y])
The claim of interest here is that the recipient argument - being affected as the ben­
eficiary of the action - is the second argument of AFFECI' on the action tier in the 
CS, which, as noted by Iackendoff and Pinker, accounts for various well known 
syntactic and semantic differences between the double object and NP [to NP] uses 
of members of this class of predicates. Now, given this analysis of double object 
predicates and the above observations concerning promise. it is reasonable to as­
sume a lexical entry such as the following for transfer of possession promise. 
(4 1) AS: 
cs: 
[x <y, z>] 
[SA Y([x] , [TO ([y])] , [CAUSE ([x] , [HAVE ([y] , [Z])] )] )]
AFFECT ([x] , ) 
AFFECT ([x] , [y] ) 
The stage is now set for an explanation for the kind of controller shift illus­
trated by (38a). Double object/transfer of possession promise optionally allows its 
theme argument ([z] in the CS in (41» to be realized by an in:fmitival phrase ex­
pressing subject potentiation, presumably by vinue of the fact that such a phrase 
has essentially the same meaning as the sort of NP headed by permission in (38b). 
Put differently. by analogy with (38b), the promise of (38a) may have the concep­
tual structure in (41),  rather than that normally associated with it when it takes a 
controlled complement (see §2 above). Crucially, in the CS in (41), the addressee is 
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also a kind of influenced. participant, i.e., the beneficiary of the transfer of posses­
sion, which is represented. by showing this argument to be the same as the second 
argument of AFFECI' on the embedded action tier. The net result is that the ad­
dressee/influenced argument (the object in an active clause) is chosen as controller 
by control principle (8b), which requires that if there is an action tier in the CS of 
the governing predicate, the second (or influenced.) argument of AFFEcr be
chosen. The possibility of subject/actor control in the cases in question is due to the 
optionality of the transfer of possession construal. That is, the analysis of promise 
sketched in §2 is also available for (38a).
On this analysis, then, what is exceptional about the controller shift construc­
tion is simply that the controlled complement realizes the theme argument of transfer 
of possession promise, which is otherwise restricted to the double object (or NP 
NP) construction. That the controller 'shifts' under these circumstances follows
from the general principles governing control. Since this analysis is keyed to con­
ceptual structure rather than syntactic configurations, it should be clear that it ex· 
tends unproblemadcally to cases of control with nominal promise, as in (35a). thus
avoiding one serious problem with the S&P analysis of controller ShifL The pr0-
posed analysis also sheds some light on why controller shift is restricted. to cases 
where the infinitival complement expresses subject potentiation. since the meaning 
of this type of phrase (being essentially the same as that of an NP headed by 
permission) is such that it can be conceived. of as undergoing a transfer of posses­
sion, in some abstract sense. 
Independent evidence for the claim that the promise of the controller shift 
construction is transfer of possession promise comes from examples such as the 
following, which show that control-shifted promise, unlike subject/actor control
promise, can be used in a context that forces the controlled complement to be con­
strued as an entity capable of undergoing a transfer of possession. 
(42) The kids will get what Ij promised thetlli, which was 
a. permission to watch TV
b. f6i to be allowed to watch TV
c. * �j to watch TV
(42b) is presumably acceptable because being allowed to watch TV, like permission 
to watch TV, is something that can be gotten (and thus possessed) and the promise 
of (42b) denotes an event involving expressed committnent to a transfer of posses­
sion of the content of the controlled complement. (42c), on the other hand, is pre­
sumably unacceptable because subject/actor control promise does Qot denote an 
event in which there is committnent to a transfer of possession; the addressee is not 
understood. as being the intended recipient of the content of the controlled comple­
ment. 
Summarizing, the lexical semantic approach to complement control laid out in
§2 makes available reasonable analyses of Visser's generalization and the controller 
shift problem without appealing to any notion of syntactic command. This is a wel-
7S 
come result insofar as a syntactic binding constraint formulated in terms of 
o-command not only provides inadequate solutions to these problems but is inde­
pendently of questionable viability. 
s .  Conclusion
There are several respects in which the 'binding' of complement control (in 
English at least) differs from that of reflexive anaphora. In particular, only the for­
mer phenomenon has the following features:
• The bindee cannot be overt. 
• The binder cannot be a suppressed argument 
• the binder must be a specific semantic argument of a governing predicate. 
It is clear that the principles governing control must be at least partially distinct from 
those governing reflexive anaphora. This conclusion does not preclude the possi· 
bility that there might be some overlap in the two sets of principles. This paper has 
shown. however, that there are good reasons not to impose on complement control 
the syntactic local command constraints of GB and HPSG theories of reflexive 
anaphora, and that the principles governing control are optimally formulated in 
terms of the constructs of argument structure and conceptual structure.
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